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Abstract. In this paper we report on our ongoing project aimed at protecting the
privacy of the user when dealing with location-based services. The starting point
of our approach is the principle of geo-indistinguishability, a formal notion of
privacy that protects the user’s exact location, while allowing approximate infor-
mation – typically needed to obtain a certain desired service – to be released. We
then present two mechanisms for achieving geo-indistinguishability, one generic
to sanitize locations in any setting with reasonable utility, the other custom-built
for a limited set of locations but providing optimal utility. Finally we extend our
mechanisms to the case of location traces, where the user releases his location
repeatedly along the day and we provide a method to limit the degradation of
the privacy guarantees due to the correlation between the points. All the mech-
anisms were tested on real datasets and compared both among themselves and
with respect to the state of the art in the field.
1 Introduction
The widespread use of Location-Based Services (LBS) in today’s world has created new
risks to user privacy that users are increasingly becoming aware of. In large part, the
worries are caused by the shocking episodes of violations and leaks that keep appearing
on the news. Just to mention a couple of them, on April 20th, 2011 it was discovered
that the iPhones were storing and collecting location data from their users, syncing them
with iTunes and transmitting them to Apple, all without the users’ knowledge. More
recently, the Guardian has revealed, on the basis of the documents provided by Edward
Snowden, that the NSA and the GCHQ have been using certain smartphone apps, such
as the wildly popular Angry Birds game, to collect users’ private information such as
age, gender and location [1].
To some extent, also the research and the experimentation on privacy contribute
to raise the awareness about the practical risks. For instance, the “Please Rob Me”
website [2] aggregates location check-ins and presents them as “robbery opportunities”,
pointing out the fact that publically announcing one’s location effectively reveals to the
world that they are not home.
A survey among 180 smartphone users, described in [3], reported that 78% of the
participants believe that apps accessing their location can pose privacy threats. Further-
more, 85% of them declared that they care about who accesses their location informa-
tion. All these worries about location privacy may seem exaggerated at first, but one
can see that they are fully justified when thinking to the possible malicious uses of lo-
cation information, such as robbing and stalking. For instance, the application “Girls
Around Me”, combines social media and location information to find nearby women
(who hadn’t necessarily agreed to be found), and, with one click the user can access
the Facebook profiles of targeted girls [4]. Particularly worrisome is the perspective of
potential combination with the users’ most sensitive information, such as sexual ori-
entation. Again, according to the Guardian [1], there have been cases of smartphone
applications from which such information was collected without the user’s knowledge.
Furthermore, location information can be easily used to obtain a variety of other
information that an individual usually wishes to protect: by collecting and processing
accurate location data on a regular basis, it is possible to infer an individual’s home or
work location, sexual preferences, political views, religious inclinations, etc.
There are numerous programs that collect location data from mobile devices. In this
paper, we focus our attention to those applications which collect such data to provide an
agreed-upon service, i.e., the LBSs. Obviously there exist methods for preventing the
collection of location data entirely, however they would completely nullify the benefits
of applications which provide location services. Our primary goal is to develop methods
that hinder the undesired tracking capacities of LBSs, while preserving as much as
possible the quality of the desired services.
Several notions of privacy for location-based systems have been proposed in the
literature. In Section 2 we give an overview of such notions, and we discuss their short-
comings in relation to our motivating LBS applications. Aiming at addressing these
shortcomings, we propose a formal privacy definition, called geo-indistinguishability,
that allows a user to disclose enough location information to obtain the desired service,
while satisfying the aforementioned privacy notion. Our proposal is based on a general-
ization of differential privacy [5] developed in [6]. Similarly to differential privacy, our
notion and technique abstract from the side information of the adversary, such as any
prior probabilistic knowledge about the user’s actual location.
To explain the principle of geo-indistinguishability, consider a user located in Paris
who wishes to query an LBS provider for nearby restaurants in a private way. To achieve
this the user employs obfuscation, i.e. he discloses some approximate location z instead
of his exact one x. Interestingly, 52% of the surveyed individuals in [3] stated no prob-
lem in supplying apps with imprecise location information to protect their privacy; only
18% objected to providing imprecise location information. Note that, in contrast to var-
ious works in the literature, we assume that the user is interested in hiding his location,
not his identity; in fact, the user might be authenticated to the service provider in order
to obtain personalized recommendations.
We say that the user enjoys `-privacy within r if, any two locations at distance at
most r produce observations with “similar” distributions, where the “level of similarity”
depends on `. The idea is that ` represents the user’s level of privacy for that radius: the
smaller ` is, the higher is the privacy.
The definition of geo-indistinguishability abstracts from r by requiring that the (in-
verse of the) level of privacy ` depend on the radius r. Formally: A mechanism satisfies
geo-indistinguishability iff for any radius r > 0, the user enjoys r-privacy within r.
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This definition implies that the user is protected within any radius r, but with a level
` = r that increases with the distance. Within a short radius, for instance r=1 km, `
is small, guaranteeing that the provider cannot infer the user’s location within, say, the
7th arrondissement of Paris. Farther away from the user, for instance for r = 1000 km,
` becomes large, allowing the LBS provider to infer that with high probability the user
is located in Paris instead of, say, London.
We propose a mechanism that achieves geo-indistinguishability by perturbating the
user’s location x. The inspiration for our mechanism comes from one of the most
popular approaches for differential privacy, namely the Laplace noise. We adopt a
specific planar version of the Laplace distribution, allowing to draw points in a geo-
indistinguishable way; moreover, we are able to do so efficiently, by using polar coor-
dinates. Another advantage of the resulting mechanism is that it is independent from the
particular user or the area it is used in, the only parameter is the desired level of privacy
or conversely the desired level of accuracy of the service.
Clearly, the perturbation of the information sent to the LBS provider leads to a
degradation of the quality of service, and consequently there is a trade-off between the
level of privacy that the user wishes to guarantee and the service quality loss (QL)
that he has to accept. The study of this trade-off, and the design of mechanisms which
optimize it, is an important research direction started with the seminal paper of Shokri
et al. [7]. In [8] we have compared our mechanism with other ones in the literature,
using the privacy metric proposed in [9]. It turns our that our mechanism offers the best
privacy guarantees, for the same utility, among those which do not depend on the user.
The advantages of the independence from the user are obvious: first, the mechanism
is designed once and for all, we do not need different mechanisms for different users.
Second, even the same user may have different behaviors, for instance during different
parts of the day, and it would not be practical to change the mechanism all the time.
Finally, computing the prior of the user can be an expensive operation, and in some
cases even unfeasible.
However, if we are interested in protecting a particular user, then in general there are
mechanisms, specific for that user, that do better than the generic Laplace mechanism.
Thus, we are also interested in defining specialized mechanisms that optimize the trade-
off between geo-indistinguishability and quality of service for a particular user. More
precisely, given a certain threshold on the degree of geo-indistinguishability, and a prior,
we aim at obtaining the mechanism K which minimizes the QL. Based on the fact that
the geo-indistinguishability threshold can be expressed by linear constraints, we can
reduce the problem of producing such an optimal K to a linear optimization problem,
which can then be solved by using standard techniques of linear programming.
The two mechanisms discussed above correspond to a sporadic use of the service
in which a single location needs to be sanitized. In practice, however, a user might
performs repeated location-based queries from several locations, forming a location
trace that he wishes to protect. For each query, a new obfuscated location needs to be
reported to the service provider, which can be easily obtained by independently adding
noise at the moment when each query is executed. We refer to independently applying
noise to each location as the independent mechanism.
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However, it is easy to see that privacy is degraded as the number of queries in-
creases, due to the correlation between the locations. Intuitively, in the extreme case
when the user never moves (i.e. there is perfect correlation), the reported locations
are centered around the real one, thus revealing it more and more precisely as the
number of queries increases. Technically, the independent mechanism applying -geo-
indistinguishable noise (where  is a privacy parameter) to n locations can be shown to
satisfy n-geo-indistinguishability. This is typical in the area of differential privacy, in
which  is thought as a privacy budget, consumed by each query; this linear increase
makes the mechanism applicable only when the number of queries remains small. In
order to deal with multiple queries we propose a trace obfuscation mechanism with a
smaller budget consumption rate than applying independent noise [10]. The main idea
is to actually use the correlation from previous locations to try to predict a point close
to the user’s actual location. Predicted points are safe to report directly and thus have a
smaller footprint on the privacy budget.
We experimentally compare the above mechanisms on two large real-life data sets,
Geolife and Tdrive. The results show the utility improvements of the optimal con-
structed mechanism wrt the Laplace one, as well as the improvements of the predictive
mechanism wrt the independently applied noise.
This paper presents a systematic overview of the approach to location privacy de-
veloped by our INRIA team Comète. Some of the results presented here have appeared
in previous papers of ours specialized in particular aspects of the project [8,10,11].
Road Map. In Section 2 we discuss notions of location privacy from the literature and
point out their weaknesses and strengths. In Section 3 we formalize the notion of geo-
indistinguishability in three equivalent ways. We then proceed to describe two mech-
anisms that provide geo-indistinguishability in Section 4: one general, the other with
optimal utility. In Section 5 we propose a predictive mechanism that exploits correla-
tions on the input by means of a prediction function to improve the privacy guarantee.
In Section 6 we give an overview of the experimental analysis and comparison of the
mechanisms and Section 7 concludes.
2 Existing Notions of Privacy
In this section, we examine various notions of location privacy from the literature, as
well as techniques to achieve them. We consider the motivating example from the in-
troduction, of a user in Paris wishing to find nearby restaurants with good reviews. To
achieve this goal, he uses a handheld device (e.g.. a smartphone) to query a public LBS
provider. However, the user expects his location to be kept private: informally speaking,
the information sent to the provider should not allow him to accurately infer the user’s
location. Our goal is to provide a formal notion of privacy that adequately captures the
user’s expected privacy. From the point of view of the employed mechanism, we require
a technique that can be performed in real-time by a handheld device, without the need
of any trusted anonymization party.
Expected Adversary Error. The expected error of an optimal Bayesian adversary [7,9,12]
is a natural way to quantify the privacy offered by a location-obfuscation mechanism.
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Intuitively, it reflects the degree of accuracy by which an adversary can guess the real lo-
cation of the user by observing the obfuscated location, and using any side-information
available to him.
There are several works relying on this notion. In [12], a perturbation mechanism
is used to confuse the attacker by crossing paths of individual users, rendering the task
of tracking individual paths challenging. In [9], an optimal location-obfuscation mech-
anism (i.e., achieving maximum level of privacy for the user) is obtained by solving a
linear program in which the constraints are determined by the quality of service and
by the user’s profile. In [13] bandwidth constraints are also taken into account, while
[14] considers the case of repeated location reporting, as opposed to a sporadic use of
the mechanism. Furthermore, [15] analyzes the case where the attacker can also exploit
co-location information, such as geo-located pictures, shared on a social network, in
which several friends are tagged together.
It is worth noting that this privacy notion and the obfuscation mechanisms based
on it are explicitly defined in terms of the adversary’s side information. In contrast, our
notion of geo-indistinguishability abstracts from the attacker’s prior knowledge, and is
therefore suitable for scenarios where the prior is unknown, or the same mechanism
must be used for multiple users.
k-anonymity. The notion of k-anonymity is the most widely used definition of privacy
for location-based systems in the literature. Many systems in this category [16,17,18]
aim at protecting the user’s identity, requiring that the attacker cannot infer which user
is executing the query, among a set of k different users. Such systems are outside the
scope of our problem, since we are interested in protecting the user’s location.
On the other hand, k-anonymity has also been used to protect the user’s loca-
tion (sometimes called l-diversity in this context), requiring that it is indistinguishable
among a set of k points (often required to share some semantic property). One way
to achieve this is through the use of dummy locations [19,20]. This technique involves
generating k − 1 properly selected dummy points, and performing k queries to the
service provider, using the real and dummy locations. Another method for achieving
k-anonymity is through cloaking [21,22,23]. This involves creating a cloaking region
that includes k points sharing some property of interest, and then querying the service
provider for this cloaking region.
Even when side knowledge does not explicitly appear in the definition of k-anonymity,
a system cannot be proven to satisfy this notion unless assumptions are made about the
attacker’s side information. For example, dummy locations are only useful if they look
equally likely to be the real location from the point of view of the attacker. Any side
information that allows to rule out any of those points, as having low probability of
being the real location, would immediately violate the definition.
Counter-measures are often employed to avoid this issue: for instance, [19] takes
into account concepts such as ubiquity, congestion and uniformity for generating dummy
points, in an effort to make them look realistic. Similarly, [23] takes into account the
user’s side information to construct a cloaking region. Such counter-measures have
their own drawbacks: first, they complicate the employed techniques, also requiring
additional data to be taken into account (for instance, precise information about the
environment or the location of nearby users), making their application in real-time by
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a handheld device challenging. Moreover, the attacker’s actual side information might
simply be inconsistent with the assumptions being made.
As a result, notions that abstract from the attacker’s side information, such as dif-
ferential privacy, have been growing in popularity in recent years, compared to k-
anonymity-based approaches.
Differential Privacy. Differential Privacy [5] is a notion of privacy from the area of sta-
tistical databases. Its goal is to protect an individual’s data while publishing aggregate
information about the database. Differential privacy requires that modifying a single
user’s data should have a negligible effect on the query outcome. More precisely, it
requires that the probability that a query returns a value v when applied to a database
D, compared to the probability to report the same value when applied to an adjacent
database D′ – meaning that D,D′ differ in the value of a single individual – should
be within a bound of e. A typical way to achieve this notion is to add controlled ran-
dom noise to the query output, for example drawn from a Laplace distribution. An
advantage of this notion is that a mechanism can be shown to be differentially private
independently from any side information that the attacker might possess.
Differential privacy has also been used in the context of location privacy. In [24],
it is shown that a synthetic data generation technique can be used to publish statistical
information about commuting patterns in a differentially private way. In [25], a quadtree
spatial decomposition technique is used to ensure differential privacy in a database with
location pattern mining capabilities, while [26] uses variable-length n-grams to disclose
sequential data, such as mobility traces, in a differentially private way.
As shown in the aforementioned works, differential privacy can be successfully
applied in cases where aggregate information about several users is published. On the
other hand, the nature of this notion makes it poorly suitable for applications in which
only a single individual is involved, such as our motivating scenario. The secret in this
case is the location of a single user. Thus, differential privacy would require that any
change in that location should have negligible effect on the published output, making it
impossible to communicate any useful information to the service provider.
To overcome this issue, Dewri [27] proposes a mix of differential privacy and k-
anonymity, by fixing an anonymity set of k locations and requiring that the probability
to report the same obfuscated location z from any of these k locations should be sim-
ilar (up to e). This property is achieved by adding Laplace noise to each Cartesian
coordinate independently. There are however two problems with this definition: first,
the choice of the anonymity set crucially affects the resulting privacy; outside this set
no privacy is guaranteed at all. Second, the property itself is rather weak; reporting the
geometric median (or any deterministic function) of the k locations would satisfy the
same definition, although the privacy guarantee would be substantially lower than using
Laplace noise.
Nevertheless, Dewri’s intuition of using Laplace noise4 for location privacy is valid,
and [27] provides extensive experimental analysis supporting this claim. Our notion
4 The planar Laplace distribution that we use in our work, however, is different from the distribu-
tion obtained by adding Laplace noise to each Cartesian coordinate, and has better differential
privacy properties (c.f. Section 4.1).
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of geo-indistinguishability provides the formal background for justifying the use of
Laplace noise, while avoiding the need to fix an anonymity set by using the generalized
variant of differential privacy from [6].
Other location-privacy metrics. [28] proposes a location cloaking mechanism, and fo-
cuses on the evaluation of Location-based Range Queries. The degree of privacy is
measured by the size of the cloak (also called uncertainty region), and by the coverage
of sensitive regions, which is the ratio between the area of the cloak and the area of the
regions inside the cloak that the user considers to be sensitive. In order to deal with the
side-information that the attacker may have, ad-hoc solutions are proposed, like patch-
ing cloaks to enlarge the uncertainty region or delaying requests. Both solutions may
cause a degradation in the quality of service.
In [29], the real location of the user is assumed to have some level of inaccuracy,
due to the specific sensing technology or to the environmental conditions. Different
obfuscation techniques are then used to increase this inaccuracy in order to achieve a
certain level of privacy. This level of privacy is defined as the ratio between the accuracy
before and after the application of the obfuscation techniques.
Similar to the case of k-anonymity, both privacy metrics mentioned above make
implicit assumptions about the adversary’s side information. This may imply a violation
of the privacy definition in a scenario where the adversary has some knowledge about
the user’s real location.
Transformation-based approaches. A number of approaches for location privacy are
radically different from the ones mentioned so far. Instead of cloaking the user’s loca-
tion, they aim at making it completely invisible to the service provider. This is achieved
by transforming all data to a different space, usually employing cryptographic tech-
niques, so that they can be mapped back to spatial information only by the user [30,31].
The data stored in the provider, as well as the location send by the user are encrypted.
Then, using techniques from private information retrieval, the provider can return in-
formation about the encrypted location, without ever discovering which actual location
it corresponds to.
A drawback of these techniques is that they are computationally demanding, mak-
ing it difficult to implement them in a handheld device. Moreover, they require the
provider’s data to be encrypted, making it impossible to use existing providers, such as
Google Maps, which have access to the real data.
Effectiveness of attacks. An indirect way of assessing the privacy guarantees of a mech-
anism is to measure the effectiveness of various location inference attacks. Several
works present attacks and practical challenges for location privacy. In [32] the authors
develop and test a toolkit for inference attacks on the reported locations of users to dis-
cover points of interests, future locations and co-location of two individuals. The same
technique was employed in [33] focusing on de-anonymization attacks with the goal
of evaluating the effectiveness of sanitization mechanisms. In [34] the authors tested
the resilience of Geo-Indistinguishability to identification of Points of Interests of users
over two real GPS traces datasets, with varying level of privacy (and therefore noise).
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3 Geo-Indistinguishability
In this section we formalize our notion of geo-indistinguishability. As already discussed
in the introduction, the main idea behind this notion is that, for any radius r > 0, the
user enjoys r-privacy within r, i.e. the level of privacy is proportional to the radius.
Note that the parameter  corresponds to the level of privacy at one unit of distance. For
the user, a simple way to specify his privacy requirements is by a tuple (`, r), where r
is the radius he is mostly concerned with and ` is the privacy level he wishes for that
radius. In this case, it is sufficient to require -geo-indistinguishability for  = `/r; this
will ensure a level of privacy ` within r, and a proportionally selected level for all other
radii.
So far we kept the discussion on an informal level by avoiding to explicitly define
what `-privacy within r means. In the remaining of this section we give a formal defini-
tion, as well as two characterizations which clarify the privacy guarantees provided by
geo-indistinguishability.
Probabilistic model. We first introduce a simple model used in the rest of the paper. We
start with a set X of points of interest, typically the user’s possible locations. Moreover,
let Z be a set of possible reported values, which in general can be arbitrary, allowing
to report obfuscated locations, cloaking regions, sets of locations, etc. However, to sim-
plify the discussion, we sometimes consider Z to also contain spatial points, assuming
an operational scenario of a user located at x ∈ X and communicating to the attacker a
randomly selected location z ∈ Z (e.g. an obfuscated point).
Probabilities come into place in two ways. First, the attacker might have side infor-
mation about the user’s location, knowing, for example, that he is likely to be visiting
the Eiffel Tower, while unlikely to be swimming in the Seine river. The attacker’s side
information can be modeled by a prior distribution pi on X , where pi(x) is the proba-
bility assigned to the location x.
Second, the selection of a reported value in Z is itself probabilistic; for instance, z
can be obtained by adding random noise to the actual location x (a technique used in
Section 4). A mechanism K is a probabilistic function for selecting a reported value;
i.e. K is a function assigning to each location x ∈ X a probability distribution on Z ,
where K(x)(Z) is the probability that the reported point belongs to the set Z ⊆ Z ,
when the user’s location is x.5 Starting from pi and using Bayes’ rule, each observation
Z ⊆ Z of a mechanism K induces a posterior distribution σ = Bayes(pi,K,Z) on
X , defined as σ(x) = K(x)(Z)pi(x)∑
x′ K(x′)(Z)pi(x′)
.
We define the multiplicative distance between two distributions σ1, σ2 on some set
S as dP(σ1, σ2) = supS⊆S | ln σ1(S)σ2(S) |, with the convention that | ln
σ1(S)
σ2(S)
| = 0 if both
σ1(S), σ2(S) are zero and∞ if only one of them is zero.
5 For simplicity we assume distributions on X to be discrete, but allow those on Z to be con-
tinuous (c.f. Section 4). All sets to which probability is assigned are implicitly assumed to be
measurable.
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3.1 Definition
We are now ready to state our definition of geo-indistinguishability. Intuitively, a pri-
vacy requirement is a constraint on the distributions K(x),K(x′) produced by two dif-
ferent points x, x′. Let d2(·, ·) denote the Euclidean metric. Enjoying `-privacy within
r means that for any x, x′ s.t. d2(x, x′) ≤ r, the distance dP(K(x),K(x′)) between
the corresponding distributions should be at most `. Then, requiring r-privacy for all
radii r, forces the two distributions to be similar for locations close to each other, while
relaxing the constraint for those far away from each other, allowing a service provider
to distinguish points in Paris from those in London.
Definition 1 (geo-indistinguishability). A mechanismK satisfies -geo-indistinguisha-
bility iff for all x, x′:
dP(K(x),K(x′)) ≤ d2(x, x′)
Equivalently, the definition can be formulated as K(x)(Z) ≤ ed2(x,x′)K(x′)(Z) for
all x, x′ ∈ X , Z ⊆ Z . Note that for all points x′ within a radius r from x, the definition
forces the corresponding distributions to be at most r distant.
The quantity d2(x, x′) can be viewed as the distinguishability level between the
secrets x and x′. The use of the Euclidean metric d2 is natural for location privacy: the
closer (geographically) two points are, the less distinguishable we would like them to
be. Note, however, that other metrics could be used instead of d2, such as the Manhattan
metric or driving distance, depending on the application. The definition that we obtain
by using an arbitrary distinguishability metric dX , i.e. requiring that dP(K(x),K(x′)) ≤
dX (x, x
′), is referred to as dX -privacy6, and is studied on its own right in [6]. Some of
the results of this paper do not depend on the actual metric, so they are given in the
general framework of dX -privacy.
Note also that standard differential privacy simply corresponds to dh(x, x′)-privacy,
where dh is the Hamming distance between databases x, x′, i.e. the number of indi-
viduals in which they differ. However, in our scenario, using the Hamming metric of
standard differential privacy – which aims at completely protecting the value of an in-
dividual – would be too strong, since the only information is the location of a single
individual. Nevertheless, we are not interested in completely hiding the user’s location,
since some approximate information needs to be revealed in order to obtain the required
service. Hence, using a privacy level that depends on the Euclidean distance between
locations is a natural choice.
Protecting location traces. So far, we have assumed a sporadic use of an LBS, meaning
that the service is used infrequently enough that we can assume no correlation between
different uses and treat each one of them independently. In this case, the user’s secret
is a single location. In the case of repeated use, however, the user forms a location
trace which should be protected; the provider is allowed to obtain only approximate
information about the locations, their exact value should be kept private.
6 Note that we can generally consider the scaling factor  to be part of the metric, although
sometimes we emphasize it by talking of dX -privacy
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In this case, the secret is the trace, i.e. a tuple of points denoted by x = [x1, . . . , xn],
while x[i] denotes the i-th element of the trace. The notion of -geo-indistinguishability
extends naturally by defining the distance between two tuples x,x′ as:
d∞(x,x′) = maxi d2(x[i],x′[i])
and using d∞-privacy as our privacy definition. Following the idea of reasoning within
a radius r, this definition requires that two traces at most r away from each other (i.e.
such that x[i],x′[i] are all within distance r from each other) should produce distribu-
tions at most r apart.
3.2 Characterizations
In this section we state two characterizations of geo-indistinguishability, obtained from
the corresponding results of [6] (for general metrics), which provide intuitive interpre-
tations of the privacy guarantees offered by this notion.
Adversary’s conclusions under hiding. The first characterization uses the concept of
a hiding function φ : X → X . The idea is that φ can be applied to the user’s actual
location before the mechanism K, so that the latter has only access to a hidden version
φ(x), instead of the real location x. A mechanism K with hiding applied is simply
the composition K ◦ φ. Intuitively, a location remains private if, regardless of his side
knowledge (captured by his prior distribution), an adversary draws the same conclusions
(captured by his posterior distribution), regardless of whether hiding has been applied
or not. However, if φ replaces locations in Paris with those in London, then clearly the
adversary’s conclusions will be greatly affected. Hence, we require that the effect on the
conclusions depends on the maximum distance d2(φ) = supx∈X d2(x, φ(x)) between
the real and hidden location.
Theorem 1. A mechanism K satisfies -geo-indistinguishability iff for all φ : X → X ,
all priors pi on X , and all Z ⊆ Z:
dP(σ1, σ2) ≤ 2d2(φ) where σ1 = Bayes(pi,K,Z)
σ2 = Bayes(pi,K ◦ φ,Z)
Note that this is a natural adaptation of a well-known interpretation of standard
differential privacy, stating that the attacker’s conclusions are similar, regardless of his
side knowledge, and regardless of whether an individual’s real value has been used in
the query or not. This corresponds to a hiding function φ removing the value of an
individual.
Note also that the above characterization compares two posterior distributions. Both
σ1, σ2 can be substantially different than the initial knowledge pi, which means that an
adversary does learn some information about the user’s location.
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Knowledge of an informed attacker. A different approach is to measure how much the
adversary learns about the user’s location, by comparing his prior and posterior distri-
butions. However, since some information is allowed to be revealed by design, these
distributions can be far apart. Still, we can consider an informed adversary who already
knows that the user is located within a set N ⊆ X . Let d2(N) = supx,x′∈N d2(x, x′)
be the maximum distance between points in x. Intuitively, the user’s location remains
private if, regardless of his prior knowledge within N , the knowledge obtained by such
an informed adversary should be limited by a factor depending on d2(N). This means
that if d2(N) is small, i.e. the adversary already knows the location with some accu-
racy, then the information that he obtains is also small, meaning that he cannot improve
his accuracy. Denoting by pi|N the distribution obtained from pi by restricting to N (i.e.
pi|N (x) = pi(x|N)), we obtain the following characterization:
Theorem 2. A mechanism K satisfies -geo-indistinguishability iff for all N ⊆ X , all
priors pi on X , and all Z ⊆ Z:
dP(pi|N , σ|N ) ≤ d2(N) where σ = Bayes(pi,K,Z)
Note that this is a natural adaptation of a well-known interpretation of standard
differential privacy, stating that an informed adversary who already knows all values
except individual’s i, gains no extra knowledge from the reported answer, regardless of
side knowledge about i’s value [35].
Abstracting from side information. A major difference of geo-indistinguishability, com-
pared to similar approaches from the literature, is that it abstracts from the side infor-
mation available to the adversary, i.e. from the prior distribution. This is a subtle issue,
and often a source of confusion, thus we would like to clarify what “abstracting from
the prior” means. The goal of a privacy definition is to restrict the information leakage
caused by the observation. Note that the lack of leakage does not mean that the user’s
location cannot be inferred (it could be inferred by the prior alone), but instead that the
adversary’s knowledge does not increase due to the observation.
However, in the context of LBSs, no privacy definition can ensure a small leakage
under any prior, and at the same time allow reasonable utility. Consider, for instance,
an attacker who knows that the user is located at some airport, but not which one. The
attacker’s prior knowledge is very limited, still any useful LBS query should reveal at
least the user’s city, from which the exact location (i.e. the city’s airport) can be inferred.
Clearly, due to the side information, the leakage caused by the observation is high.
So, since we cannot eliminate leakage under any prior, how can we give a reasonable
privacy definition without restricting to a particular one? First, we give a formulation
(Definition 1) which does not involve the prior at all, allowing to verify it without know-
ing the prior. At the same time, we give two characterizations which explicitly quantify
over all priors, shedding light on how the prior affects the privacy guarantees.
4 Mechanisms for the sporadic case
In this section we present two mechanisms for applying noise to a single location while
satisfying geo-indistinguishability. The first one, the planar Laplace mechanism, is a
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Fig. 1. The pdf of two planar Laplace distributions, centered at (−2,−4) and at (5, 3) respec-
tively, with  = 1/5.
simple and efficient mechanism that scales to any number of possible locations while
being generic and independent from the user’s behaviour. The second is adapted to a
specific user and guarantees optimal utility (or minimum quality loss) for that user,
however it is only applicable when the number of possible locations is limited.
4.1 The planar Laplace mechanism
We start by defining a mechanism for geo-indistinguishability on the continuous plane.
The idea is that whenever the actual location is x ∈ R2, we report, instead, a point z ∈
R2 generated randomly according to a distribution with probability density function:
D(z) =
2
2pi
e− d2(x,z) (1)
This function is called the planar Laplace centered at x and is is illustrated in Figure 1.
The resulting mechanism can be shown to satisfy -geo-indistinguishability [8].
Note that this definition of the two-dimensional Laplace distribution follows [36]
and is different than generating the two coordinates independently from a standard (one
dimensional) Laplace distribution. Such an approach would not, in fact, satisfy geo-
indistinguishability.
Drawing a random point. We illustrate now how to draw a random point from the pdf
defined in (1). First of all, we note that the pdf of the planar Laplace distribution depends
only on the distance from x. It will be convenient, therefore, to switch to a system of
polar coordinates with origin x. A point z will be represented as a point (r, θ), where r
is the distance of z from x, and θ is the angle that the line x z forms with respect to the
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horizontal axis of the Cartesian system. After the transformation, the pdf of the polar
Laplace centered at the origin x is:
D(r, θ) =
2
2pi
r e− r (2)
Let R,Θ be the random variables representing the radius and the angle; the prop-
erty that allows to efficiently draw from the polar Laplace is that the two variables are
independent, that is D(r, θ) is the product of the two marginals:
D,R(r) =
∫ 2pi
0
D(r, θ) dθ = 
2 r e− r
D,Θ(θ) =
∫∞
0
D(r, θ) dr =
1
2pi
Note that D,R(r) corresponds to the gamma distribution with shape 2 and scale 1/.
Hence, in order to draw a point (r, θ) it is sufficient to draw separately r and θ from
D,R(r) and D,Θ(θ) respectively. Since D,Θ(θ) is constant, θ can be drawn from a
uniform distribution on the interval [0, 2pi).
We now show how to draw r. Following standard lines, we consider the cumulative
distribution function (cdf) C(r):
C(r) =
∫ r
0
D,R(ρ)dρ = 1− (1 +  r) e− r
Intuitively, C(r) represents the probability that the radius of the random point falls
between 0 and r. Finally, we generate a random number p with uniform probability in
the interval [0, 1), and we set r = C−1 (p). Note that
C−1 (p) = − 1
(
W−1(p−1e ) + 1
)
where W−1 is the Lambert W function (the −1 branch), which can be computed effi-
ciently and is implemented in several numerical libraries.
Note that in practice only a discretized version of the continuous mechanism can be
implemented; the discretized variant can be shown to also satisfy geo-indistinguisha-
bility, for a slightly bigger , although the difference is negligible on a double precision
machine. A detailed discussion of discretization issues can be found in [8].
The planar Laplace mechanism has two main advantages: first, it is simple and effi-
cient to compute without restricting the number of possible locations. Second, it can be
applied to a generic user without prior information on his behaviour. The usefulness of
the mechanism for generic applications is showcased in Location Guard [37], a browser
extension for Chrome and Firefox, which provides location privacy for websites access-
ing the user’s location through the HTML5 geolocation API, by adding noise to the
reported location using the planar Laplace mechanism.
On the other hand, being generic, the planar Laplace mechanism offers no optimal-
ity guarantees for the quality loss of the reported location. In the following section, we
show how to improve utility by construct mechanisms adapted to the behaviour of a
particular user.
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4.2 Geo-indistinguishable mechanisms of optimal utility
The goal of a privacy mechanism is not to hide completely the secret but to disclose
enough information to be useful for some service while hiding the rest to protect the
user’s privacy. Typically these two requirements go in opposite directions: a stronger
privacy level requires more noise which results in a lower utility.
From the user’s point of view, we want to quantify the service quality loss (QL) pro-
duced by the mechanism K. Given a quality metric dQ on locations, such that dQ(x, z)
measures how much the quality decreases by reporting z when the real location is x (the
Euclidean metric d2 being a typical choice), we can naturally define the quality loss as
the expected distance between the real and the reported location, that is
QL(K,pi, dQ) =
∑
x,z pi(x)K(x)(z)dQ(x, z)
where pi is a prior on X modeling the user’s behaviour.
Despite the generality of the planar Laplace mechanism, in some cases we want to
be able to build a mechanism that optimizes the trade-off between privacy (in terms of
geo-indistinguishability) and quality loss (in terms of QL) for a specific user. Our main
goal is, given a set of locations X with a privacy metric dX , a privacy level , a user
profile pi and a quality metric dQ, to find an dX -private mechanism such that its QL is
as small as possible. We start by describing a set of linear constraints that enforce dX -
privacy, which allows to obtain an optimal mechanism as a linear optimization problem.
However, the number of constraints can be large, making the approach computationally
demanding as the number of locations increases. As a consequence, we then propose an
approximate solution that replaces dX with the metric induced by a spanning graph.
Constructing an optimal mechanism. The constructed mechanism is assumed to have
as both input and output a predetermined finite set of locations X . For instance, X can
be constructed by dividing the map in a finite number of regions (of arbitrary size and
shape), and selecting in X a representative location for each region. We also assume a
prior pi over X , representing the probability of the user being at each location at any
given time. Since X is finite, a mechanismK can be represented by a stochastic matrix,
where kxz is the probability to report z from location x.
Given a privacy metric dX and a privacy parameter , the goal is to construct a dX -
private mechanism K such that the service quality loss with respect to a quality metric
dQ is minimum. This property is formally defined below:
Definition 2. Given a prior pi, a privacy metric dX , a privacy parameter  and a quality
metric dQ, a mechanism K is dX -OPTQL(pi, dQ) iff:
1. K is dX -private, and
2. for all mechanisms K ′, if K ′ is dX -private then
QL(K,pi, dQ) ≤ QL(K ′, pi, dQ)
In order for K to be dX -private it should satisfy the following constraints:
kxz ≤ edX (x,x′)kx′z x, x′, z ∈ X
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Hence, we can construct an optimal mechanism by solving a linear optimization prob-
lem, minimizing QL(K,pi, dQ) while satisfying dX -privacy:
Minimize:
∑
x,z∈X
pixkxzdQ(x, z)
Subject to: kxz ≤ edX (x,x′)kx′z x, x′, z ∈ X∑
z∈X
kxz = 1 x ∈ X
kxz ≥ 0 x, z ∈ X
It is easy to see that the mechanism K generated by the previous optimization prob-
lem is dX -OPTQL(pi, dQ).
A more efficient method using spanners. In the optimization problem of the previous
section, the dX -privacy definition introduces |X |3 constraints in the linear program.
However, in order to be able to manage a large number of locations, we would like to
reduce this amount to a number in the order of O(|X |2).
So far we are not making any assumption about dX , and therefore we need to specify
|X | constraints for each pair of locations x and x′. However, it is worth noting that if
the distance dX is induced by a weighted graph (i.e. the distance between each pair of
locations is the weight of a minimum path in a graph), then we only need to consider
|X | constraints for each pair of locations that are adjacent in the graph.
It might be the case, though, that the metric dX is not induced by any graph (other
than the complete graph), and consequently the amount of constraints remains the same.
In fact, this is generally the case for the Euclidean metric. Therefore, we consider the
case in which dX can be approximated by some graph-induced metric.
If G is an undirected weighted graph, we denote with dG the distance function
induced by G, i.e. dG(x, x′) denotes the weight of a minimum path between the nodes
x and x′ inG. Then, if the set of nodes ofG is X and the weight of its edges is given by
the metric dX , we can approximate dX with dG. In this case, we say thatG is a spanning
graph, or a spanner [38,39], of X .
Definition 3 (Spanner). A weighted graph G = (X , E), with E ⊆ X ×X and weight
function w : E → R is a spanner of X if
w(x, x′) = dX (x, x′) ∀(x, x′) ∈ E
Note that if G is a spanner of X , then
dG(x, x
′) ≥ dX (x, x′) ∀x, x′ ∈ X
A main concept in the theory of spanners is that of dilation, also known as stretch factor:
Definition 4 (Dilation). Let G = (X , E) be a spanner of X . The dilation of G is
calculated as:
δ = max
x 6=x′∈X
dG(x, x
′)
dX (x, x′)
A spanner of X with dilation δ is called a δ-spanner of X .
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Informally, a δ-spanner of X can be considered an approximation of the metric dX
in which distances between nodes are “stretched” by a factor of at most δ.
If G is a δ-spanner of X , then it holds that
dG(x, x
′) ≤ δdX (x, x′) ∀x, x′ ∈ X
which leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 1. Let X be a set of locations with metric dX , and let G be a δ-spanner of
X . If a mechanism K for X is δdG-private, then K is dX -private.
We can then propose a new optimization problem to obtain a dX -private mecha-
nism. If G = (X , E) is a δ-spanner of X , we require not the constraints corresponding
to dX -privacy, but those corresponding to δdG-privacy instead, that is, |X | constraints
for each edge of G:
Minimize:
∑
x,z∈X
pixkxzdQ(x, z)
Subject to: kxz ≤ e δ dG(x,x′)kx′z z ∈ X , (x, x′) ∈ E∑
x∈X
kxz = 1 x ∈ X
kxz ≥ 0 x, z ∈ X
Since the resulting mechanism is δdG-private, by Proposition 1 it must also be dX -
private. However, the number of constraints induced by δdG-privacy is now |E||X |.
Moreover, as discussed in the next section, for any δ > 1 there is an algorithm that
generates a δ-spanner with O( |X |δ−1 ) edges, which means that, fixing δ, the total number
of constraints of the linear program is O(|X |2).
It is worth noting that although dX -privacy is guaranteed, optimality is lost: the
obtained mechanism is δdG-OPTQL(pi, dQ) but not necessarily dX -OPTQL(pi, dQ),
since the set of δdG-private mechanisms is a subset of the set of dX -private mecha-
nisms. The QL of the obtained mechanism will now depend on the dilation δ of the
spanner: the smaller δ is, the closer the QL of the mechanism will be from the optimal
one. In consequence, there is a trade-off between the accuracy of the approximation and
the number of constraints in linear program.
5 Mechanisms for the repeated case
In the previous section we considered a sporadic use of a service, in which case only a
single location needs to be obfuscated. We now turn our attention to the repeated case,
in which the user’s location trace (sometimes called trajectory in the literature) needs
to be protected. We denote by x = [x1, . . . , xn] a trace, by x[i] the i-th element of x, by
[ ] the empty trace and by x :: x the trace obtained by adding x to the head of x. We also
define tail(x :: x) = x. As already discussed in Section 3.1, geo-indistinguishability
can be naturally extended to the case of location traces by using d∞ as the underlying
distinguishability metric.
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5.1 Independent Mechanism
mechanism IM (x )
z := [ ]
f o r i := 1 t o |x|
z := N(N )(x[i])
z := z :: z
re turn z
Fig. 2: Independent
Mechanism
In order to sanitize x we can simply apply a noise mech-
anism independently to each secret xi. We assume that a
family of noise mechanisms N(N ) : X → P(Z) are
available, parametrized by N , where each mechanism
N(N ) satisfies N -privacy. Both mechanisms of Sec-
tion 4 can be used for this purpose. The resulting mech-
anism, called the independent mechanism IM : Xn →
P(Zn), is shown in Figure 2. As explained in the intro-
duction, the main issue with IM is that it is nd∞-private,
i.e. the budget consumed increases linearly with n.
5.2 A predictive dX -private mechanism
We introduce now our prediction-based approach. The fundamental intuition is that the
correlation of the points in the trace can be exploited to the advantage of the mechanism.
A simple way of doing this is to try to predict new points from past information; if the
point can be predicted with enough accuracy it is called easy; in this case the prediction
can be reported without adding new noise. One the other hand, hard points, that is those
that cannot be predicted, are sanitized with new noise. However testing if a point is easy
or hard reveals some information about the real location and violates dX -privacy as for
different locations we might have different answers. In order to respect the definition
we will need to make the test dX -private itself, reducing its precision and adding a new
cost to our global budget. We will show that with enough correlation in the input the
gain in predicted points is worth the cost of the test.
Let B = {0, 1}. A boolean b ∈ B denotes whether a point is easy (0) or hard (1).
A sequence r = [z1, b1, . . . , zn, bn] of reported values and booleans is called a run; the
set of all runs is denoted by R = (Z × B)∗. A run will be the output of our predictive
mechanism; note that the booleans bi are considered public and will be reported by the
mechanism.
Main components. The predictive mechanism has three main components: first, the
prediction is a deterministic function Ω : R → Z , taking as input the run reported
up to this moment and trying to predict the next reported point, which should be at an
acceptable distance from the actual one. The output of the prediction function is denoted
by z˜ = Ω(r). Note that the possibility of a successful prediction should not be viewed
as a privacy violation because Ω predicts the reported location, not the actual one.
Second, a test is a family of mechanisms Θ(θ, l, z˜) : X → P(B), parametrized
by θ, l, z˜. The test takes as input the point x and reports whether the prediction z˜ is
acceptable or not for this point. If the test is successful then the prediction will be used
instead of generating new noise. The purpose of the test is to guarantee a certain level
of utility: predictions that are farther than the threshold l should be rejected. Since the
test is accessing the actual location, it should be private itself, where θ is the allowed
budget for testing.
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Fig. 3: Predictive Mechanism
The test mechanism that will be used throughout the paper is the one below, which
is based on adding Laplace noise to the threshold l:
Θ(θ, l, z˜)(x) =
{
0 if dX (x, z˜) ≤ l + Lap(θ)
1 ow. (3)
The test is defined for all θ > 0, l ∈ [0,+∞), z˜ ∈ Z , and can be used for any
metric dX , as long as the domain of reported locations is the same as the one of the
actual locations, so that dX (x, z˜) is well defined.
Finally, a noise mechanism is a family of mechanisms N(N ) : X → P(Z),
parametrized by the available budget N . The noise mechanism is used for hard se-
crets that cannot be predicted and can be any of the sporadic mechanisms presented in
Section 4, although in the following we will assume the use of the planar Laplace for
simplicity.
Budget management. The parameters of the mechanism’s components need to be con-
figured at each step. This can be done in a dynamic way using the concept of a budget
manager. A budget manager β is a function that takes as input the run produced so far
and returns the budget and the threshold to be used for the test at this step as well as the
budget for the noise mechanism: β(r) = (θ, N , l).
Of course the amount of budget used for the test should always be less than the
amount devoted to the noise, otherwise it would be more convenient to just use the
independent noise mechanism. Still, there is great flexibility in configuring the various
parameters and several strategies can be implemented in terms of a budget manager.
The mechanism. We are now ready to fully describe our mechanism. A single step of the
predictive mechanism, displayed in Figure 3, is a family of mechanisms Step(r) : X →
P(Z × B), parametrized by the run r reported up to this point. The mechanism takes
a location x and returns a reported location z, as well as a boolean b denoting whether
the secret was easy or hard. First, the mechanism obtains the various configuration
parameters from the budget manager as well as a prediction z˜. Then the prediction
is tested using the test mechanism. If the test is successful the prediction is returned,
otherwise a new reported location is generated using the noise mechanism.
Finally, the predictive mechanism, displayed in Figure ??, is a mechanism PM :
Xn → P(R). It takes as input a trace x, and applies Step(r) to each point, while
extending at each step the run r with the new reported values (z, b).
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Note that an important advantage of the mechanism is that it is online, that is the
sanitization of each location does not depend on future ones. This means that the user
can query at any time during the life of the system, as opposed to offline mechanisms
were all the requests need to be generated before the sanitization.
The main innovation of this mechanism if the use of the prediction function, which
allows to decouple the privacy mechanism from the correlation analysis, creating a
family of modular mechanisms where by plugging in different predictions we are able
to work in new domains.
Privacy It can be shown that the predictive mechanism, given a family of test functions
and noise functions respectively θ and N dX -private, is itself dX -private. The global
budget β(r) is actually dependent on the budget manager and on the specific run, which
is incompatible with dX -privacy that is always independent from the prior. The reason
is that a hard step is more expensive than an easy step because of the cost of the noise
mechanism. Therefore there is a difference between the budget spent on a “good” run,
where the input has a considerable correlation, the prediction performs well and the
majority of steps are easy, and a run with uncorrelated secrets, where any prediction
is useless and all the steps are hard. In the latter case it is clear that our mechanism
wastes part of its budget on tests that always fail, performing worse than an independent
mechanism.
However we can still enforce the definition with the use of a -bounded budget man-
ager. Such a budget manager provides a fixed privacy guarantee by sacrificing utility:
in the case of a bad run it either needs to lower the budget spend per secret, leading to
more noise, or to stop early, handling a smaller number of requests. In this case the bud-
get manager moves the impact of the runs away from the privacy budget and to utility.
Two such managers were developed, both with fixed global privacy, one improving QL
for a fixed number of requests, the other increasing the number of requests for a certain
fixed QL.
6 Evaluation
We experimentally verify the effectiveness of our mechanisms on the motivating exam-
ple of a user performing various activities in a city, using two large data sets of GPS
trajectories in the Beijing urban area ([40,41]). Geolife [40] collects the movements
of several users, using a variety of transportation means, including walking, while in
Tdrive [41] we find exclusively taxi drivers trajectories. Due to space restrictions, only
a small part of the results are given here; a detailed evaluation is available in [8,10,11].
Optimal mechanism. To show the benefits of using a mechanism with optimal utility,
we compare now the QL of the optimal mechanism (OPTQL) and of the planar Laplace
(PL) when both are generated with the same privacy level . We can see the results
in Figure 4. The OPTQL mechanism clearly offers a better utility to the user, while
guaranteeing the same level of geo-indistinguishability.
Regarding the spanner approximation of the optimal mechanism, the relation be-
tween the dilation and the number of constraints is shown in Figure 4. It is clear that the
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Fig. 4: Left: Quality loss of the OPTQL and PL mechanisms for different values of .
The mechanisms were calculated for all users. Points represent the utility for every user,
while the two lines join the medians for each mechanism and each value of . Right:
Relation between the approximation ratio and the number of constraints in the linear
program. This number is independent from the user and from the value of .
number of constraints decreases exponentially with respect to the dilation, and there-
fore even for small dilations (which in turn mean good approximations) the number of
constraints is significantly reduced with the proposed approximation technique. For in-
stance, we have 87250 constraints for δ = 1 (the optimal case), and 25551 constraints
for δ = 1.05. This represents a decrease of 71% with respect to the optimal case, with
only 1.05 approximation ratio.
Predictive mechanism. In order to model both frequent (easier to predict) as well as
seldom users, the GPS traces were sampled with a different probability of jumping,
i.e. performing a query with a long delay (one hour) after the previous one. The test
included two budget managers, one optimizing QL for a fixed number of queries (fixed-
rate), the other reducing budget consumption to prolong the use of the system at a fixed
QL (fixed-ql). The results, shown in Figure 5, show considerable improvements with
respect to independently applied noise, for both managers: we are able to decrease the
average error up to 40% and the budget consumption rate up to 64%. The improvements
are significant enough to broaden the applicability of geo-indistinguishability to cases
impossible before: in our experiments we cover 30 queries with reasonable error which
is enough for a full day of usage; alternatively we can drive the error down from 5 km
to 3 km, which make it acceptable for a variety of applications.
7 Related work
Several related works have been already presented in Section 2, a few more are dis-
cussed in this section.
On the side of the optimal mechanism construction, the work closest to ours is [42],
which independently proposes a linear programming technique to construct an optimal
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Fig. 5: (Left) Average and 90th percentile error for fixed-rate. (Right) Budget consump-
tion rate for fixed-ql.
obfuscation mechanism wrt either the expected adversary error or geo-indistinguisha-
bility. Although there is an overlap in the main construction (the optimization problem
of Section 4.2), most of the results are substantially different. The approximation tech-
nique of [42] consists of discarding some of the geo-indistinguishability constraints
when the distance involved is larger than a certain lower bound. This affects the geo-
indistinguishability guarantees of the mechanism, although the effect can be tuned by
properly selecting the bound for discarding constraints. On the other hand, our approx-
imation technique, based on spanning graphs, can be used to reduce the number of
constraints from cubic to quadratic without jeopardizing the privacy guarantees, by ac-
cepting a small decrease on the utility.
On the side of the predictive mechanism, our work was mainly inspired by the
median mechanism [43], a work on differential privacy for databases based on the idea
of exploiting the correlation on the queries to improve the budget usage. The mechanism
uses a concept similar to our prediction to determine the answer to the next query using
only past answers. An analogous work is the multiplicative weights mechanism [44],
again in the context of statistical databases. The mechanism keeps a parallel version of
the database which is used to predict the next answer and in case of failure it is updated
with a multiplicative weights technique.
A key difference from our context is that in the above works, several queries are
performed against the same database. In our setting, however, the secret (the position
of the user) is always changing, which requires to exploit correlations in the data. This
scenario is explored also in [45] were the authors consider the case of an evolving secret
and develop a differentially private counter.
Another work very close in spirit to ours is [46]. The authors of this paper also
consider the problem of location privacy for location based services, and use random
noise to conceal the actual location. However their work is mainly focused on exploiting
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the features of existing technology, and does not attempt to give a rigorous definition of
privacy guarantees.
In a recent paper [3], Fawaz and Shin propose the Location Privacy Guardian,
which is perhaps the most complete framework, in the current state of the art, for privacy
protection within smartphone applications. They consider several potential sources of
privacy breaches (profiling, tracking, etc.) and propose solutions for each of them. For
location privacy, they use our Laplace mechanism.
8 Conclusion
In this paper we have presented a framework for achieving privacy in location-based
applications, taking into account the desired level of protection as well as the side-
information that the attacker might have about the user. The core of our proposal is a
new notion of location privacy, that we call geo-indistinguishability. In order to ensure
this kind of privacy protection in location-based services, we have proposed mecha-
nisms that achieve geo-indistinguishability by perturbating the actual location with ran-
dom noise. We have considered two kinds of mechanisms: the first one is universal,
i.e., it does not depend on the user, and uses a bivariate version of the Laplace function
as the density function of the noise. The second one is designed assuming a particu-
lar user, and for that user it achieves the optimal trade off between privacy and utility.
This is done by formulating the optimal trade off as a linear programming problem,
whose solution are the conditional probabilities that compose the noise matrix. Finally,
we have considered the problem of traces, namely the repeated use of the mechanism
to generate a sequence of points (a situation that may arise, for instance, when the
user makes several requests to the service during a walk), and we have addressed the
problem of the degradation of the level of privacy due to the correlation of the actual
locations. We have proposed a method that limits the degradation by applying a predic-
tion mechanism, which allows to generate new reported locations without applying the
mechanism at each step. Finally, we have evaluated our methods and showed that they
are a considerable improvement w.r.t. the state of the art, and that our proposal to limit
the negative effects of the correlation in traces is effective in practice.
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